On December 13, 2004, the U. S. Supreme Court ruled that the effectiveness of defense counsel’s performance must be judged by standards previously set out by the Court in Strickland v. Washington. In Florida v. Nixon, Joe Nixon’s attorney told the jury his client was guilty without his client’s express consent. After the jury sentenced Nixon to death, the Florida Supreme Court overturned Nixon’s conviction, holding that counsel’s concession of guilt automatically fell below an objective standard of reasonable performance, necessitating a new trial. The court ruled that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance was presumptively prejudicial to Nixon. The U.S. Supreme Court overruled the Florida court, holding that a concession of guilt by counsel made without the express consent of the defendant does not automatically constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, but must be judged by Strickland’s two-pronged test: sub-par representation AND a likely effect on the outcome of the case. The case is Florida v. Nixon, No 03-931, 543 U.S. ___ (2004). See Supreme Court and Representation.