United States Supreme Court Decisions: 2009-2010 Term
MAGWOOD v. CULLIVER, No. 09-158
Cert. granted on Nov. 16, 2009
The Court agreed to hear Magwood v. Culliver (No. 09-158). Billy Joe Magwood received a death sentence for killing a sheriff in 1979 in Alabama. At the time, Alabama law required two conditions before the state could sentence a defendant to death, only one of which was satisfied by Magwood's crime. Magwood's death sentence was overturned on other grounds in 1985, and he was resentenced to death the next year. However, it was not until 1997 that Magwood's lawyers challenged whether his crime was death-eligible under Alabama law. Alabama claims Magwood took too long to raise this argument and his appeal is barred by the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, which imposes strict limits on successive federal habeas corpus petitions. The Eleventh Circuit agreed. Magwood claims that he is bringing his claim under his new death sentence and therefore is not barred by AEDPA.
The issue accepted by the Court in Magwood is: When a person is resentenced after having obtained federal habeas relief from an earlier sentence, is a claim in a federal habeas petition challenging that new sentencing judgment a “second or successive” claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) if the petitioner could have challenged his previous sentence on the same constitutional grounds?
See the opinion of the court below (11th Cir.).
(A. Liptak, "30 Years After Murder, Is His Appeal Too Late?," New York Times, November, 16, 2009)
HOLLAND V. FLORIDA, No. 09-5327
Cert. granted on Oct. 13, 2009
The Court agreed to hear Holland v. Florida, a case raising the question of "whether 'gross negligence' by a state-appointed defense attorney in a death penalty case provides a basis for extending the time to file a federal habeas challenge, in a case where the habeas plea was filed late despite repeated instructions from the client." (scotusblog.com). In his petition for certiorari to the Court, the defendant stated, "Despite the State of Florida's promise to Petitioner that he have counsel to competently and effectively represent him in both his state and federal postconviction litigation, a promise that would be purportedly enforced by judicial monitoring, Petitioner's state collateral attorney, Mr. Collins, failed to timely file a (habeas corpus) §2254 petition on behalf of Petitioner." The defendant then filed his own petition for habeas corpus and, while admitting it was filed late, asked that the deadline be extended because of the serious error by his appointed attorney.
Questions Presented:
In determining that Petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling to excuse the late filing of his habeas petition, the Eleventh Circuit determined that the reason for the late filing was the "gross negligence" on part of Petitioner's state-appointed collateral attorney's failure to file the petition in a timely fashion despite repeated instructions from the Petitioner to do so. However, under the new test announced by the Eleventh Circuit in Petitioner's case, no allegation of attorney negligence or failure to meet a lawyer's standard of care, in the absence of bad faith, dishonesty, divided loyalty, or mental impairment, could ever qualify as an exceptional circumstance warranting equitable tolling.
This Court should grant certiorari to the Eleventh Circuit to determine whether "gross negligence" by collateral counsel, which directly results in the late filing of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, can qualify as an exceptional circumstance warranting equitable tolling, or whether, in conflict with other circuits, the Eleventh Circuit was proper in determining that factors beyond "gross negligence" must be established before an extraordinary circumstance can be found that would warrant equitable tolling.
(See Scotusblog, Albert Holland v. State of Florida, No. 09-5327, Oct. 13, 2009; Petition for Writ of Cert. to 11th Cir., May 13, 2009, at 8-10)).
Read lower court opinion (11th Cir.).
BEARD V. KINDLER, No. 08-992
Cert. granted on May 18, 2009
Oral argument: Nov. 2, 2009
In Beard v. Kindler, Pennyslvania is challenging a federal court decision granting relief. The case involves defendant Joseph Kindler, who was convicted and sentenced to death in 1983 for the murder of a witness against him in a burglary incident. Following his conviction, Kindler escaped from prison, but was recaptured one year later in Canada. He escaped again, and finally was extradited back to the United States in 1991. In response to his escape, the trial court dismissed the defendant’s post-conviction motions. Upon his return to the United States, the defendant filed an appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court arguing that the trial court had abused its discretion in dismissing his post-conviction motions. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the trial court. However, in 1999 a federal District Court ruled that the state's ground for dismissing Kindler's appeal was inadequate and vacated Kindler’s death sentence. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld this decision, stating that “because state law allowed for discretion to reinstate post-verdict motions following a fugitive’s recapture, any exercise of that discretion to deny reinstatement was not the product of a 'firm' rule, and…could not provide an adequate state ground.” Under the adequate state grounds doctrine, federal courts do not review state court rulings if the ground for the decision rested on state law that was adequate to support the ruling. In its petition, the State argues that room for discretion in a state procedural rule does not automatically render a decision under that rule inadequate. Since Kindler's extradition, the Canadian Supreme Court has held that fugitives should not be extradited from Canada unless there is assurance that the death penalty wil not be sought against the defendant. See Beard v. Kindler, Petition for Writ of Certiorari (February 2, 2009).
Questions Presented:
1. After murdering a witness against him and
receiving a sentence of death, respondent broke out
of prison, twice. Prior to his recapture in Canada
years later, the trial court exercised its discretion
under state forfeiture law to dismiss respondent’s
post-verdict motions, resulting in default of most
appellate claims. On federal habeas corpus review,
the court of appeals refused to honor the state
court’s procedural bar, ruling that, because "the
state court.., had discretion" in applying the rule,
it was not "firmly established" and was therefore
"inadequate."
2. Is a state procedural rule automatically
"inadequate" under the adequate-state-grounds
doctrine - and therefore unenforceable on federal
habeas corpus review - because the state rule is
discretionary rather than mandatory?
WOOD V. ALLEN, No. 08-9156
Cert. granted on May 18, 2009
Oral argument: Nov. 4, 2009
The Court accepted the defendant's petition in Wood v. Allen, a case from Alabama. Holly Wood claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, mental retardation, and discrimination in the jury selection process during his trial. After the trial, state and defense experts found that Wood, with an IQ below 70, had serious deficits in intellectual functioning and in at least one area of adaptive functioning--clear evidence of mental retardation. However, despite obvious pre-trial indications of this disability, the defense attorney presented no mitigating evidence on this issue to the jury during the penalty phase of the trial. The novice attorney had no experience in death penalty cases or in any criminal law. In federal habeas proceedings, the District Court vacated Wood’s death sentence due to ineffectiveness of counsel, stating that “[c]ounsel’s failure to investigate and present any evidence of intellectual functioning…is sufficient to undermine confidence in the application of the death sentence.”
Ultimately, however, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the District Court’s grant of relief. The first question before the Supreme Court is whether the state court acted unreasonably in concluding that the inexperienced defense lawyer's decision to leave out this mitigating evidence was strategic, when a review of the entire record indicated it was due to attorney ineptitude. Secondly, the Court will consider a split among the federal circuit courts about the deference they should give to state courts under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. Wood maintains that the federal court is obligated to consider the entire record of the case when reviewing the reasonableness of a state court finding, rather than focusing on only parts of the record. See Wood v. Allen, Petition for Writ of Certiorari (March 12, 2009).
Questions Presented (Note: Court agreed to hear case only on first two questions):
1. Whether a state court's decision on post-conviction review is based on an unreasonable determination of the facts when it concludes that, during the sentencing phase of a capital case, the failure of a novice attorney with no criminal law experience to pursue or present evidence of defendant's severely impaired mental functioning was a strategic decision, while the court ignores evidence in the record before it that demonstrates otherwise?
2. Whether the rule followed by some circuits, including the majority in this case, abdicates the court's judicial review function under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act by failing to determine whether a state court decision was unreasonable in light of the entire state court record and instead focusing solely on whether there is clear and convincing evidence in that record to rebut certain subsidiary factual findings?
3. Whether a state court unreasonably applies Atkins v. Virginia when it bases its finding that a defendant does not have significant deficits in adaptive functioning and thus is not mentally retarded on an analysis of the defendant's relative strengths in adaptive functioning without considering the defendant's limitations, which is inconsistent with the accepted and established clinical definitions of mental retardation?
4. Whether a petitioner seeking habeas relief in federal court may rely on a comparative juror analysis to demonstrate a Batson v. Kentucky violation where that analysis is based on facts from the state trial court record, but was not presented to the state trial court?
SMITH V. SPISAK, No. 08-724
Cert. granted on Feb. 23, 2009
Oral argument: October 13, 2009
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari for a second time in Smith v. Spisak to review questions of jury instructions presented during the penalty phase and ineffective assistance of counsel. Frank Spisak was convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of three people at Cleveland State University in 1982. While the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentence, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit granted habeas corpus relief, thereby vacating Spisak’s death sentence. The Sixth Circuit held the judge's sentencing instructions were improper because they suggested to the jury that unanimity had to be reached on individual mitigating factors and that the defendant had to be unanimously acquitted of the death sentence before a life sentence could be imposed. Additionally, the Sixth Circuit ruled that defense counsel had been constitutionally ineffective during penalty-phase closing arguments, making inappropriate statements about the defendant that may have impacted the outcome of the sentencing decision.
In 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the judgment handed down by the Sixth Circuit and remanded the case to be reconsidered in light of Carey v. Musladin and Schriro v. Landrigan. However, the Sixth Circuit found those cases distinguishable and reinstated its grant of sentencing relief to Spisak. The U.S. Supreme Court has again granted the State’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari and will decide whether the Sixth Circuit's decision on the issue of jury instructions conformed to federal law and legal precedent, and whether it exceeded its authority in finding defendant’s trial counsel constitutionally ineffective.
(See also Spisak v. Mitchell, No. 03-4034 (6th Cir. April 11, 2008)).
Questions Presented:
1. Did the Sixth Circuit contravene the directives
of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996 ("AEDPA") and Carey v. Musladin, 127 S. Ct.
649 (2006), when it applied Mills v. Maryland, 486
U.S. 367 (1988), to resolve in a habeas petitioner's
favor questions that were not decided or addressed in
Mills?
2. Did the Sixth Circuit exceed its authority under
AEDPA when it applied United States v. Cronic.
466 U.S. 648 (1984), to presume that a habeas
petitioner suffered prejudice from several allegedly
deficient statements made by his trial counsel during
closing argument instead of deferring to the Ohio
Supreme Court's reasonable rejection of the claim
under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984)?
WONG v BELMONTES, No. 08-1263
Cert. granted and decided Nov. 16, 2009 (per curiam)
On November 16, the United States Supreme Court accepted for review and handed down a per curiam decision in Wong v. Belmontes (No. 08-1263). The Court reinstated Fernando Belmontes' death sentence and overturned the decision of the Ninth Circuit granting relief because of ineffectiveness of counsel. Belmontes was sentenced to death for murdering a woman during a robbery in 1981 in California. The appeals court ruled in 2008 that Belmontes' lawyer had represented him incompetently by neglecting to introduce evidence of family strife and depression that would have likely led to a different sentence. The Supreme Court assumed that the attorney should have presented more evidence but concluded it would not have made any difference in sentencing. Justice Stevens issued a concurring opinion stating that he believed the Supreme Court had erred in a previous consideration of this same case.
(See B. Egelko, "Central Valley killer back in line for death," San Francisco Chronicle, November 16, 2009)
BOBBY V. VAN HOOK, No. 09–144
Cert. granted and decided Nov. 9, 2009 (per curiam)
On November 9, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case of Bobby v. Van Hook and issued a per curiam opinion overturning a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which had granted Robert Van Hook a new sentencing hearing based on ineffectiveness of counsel. Van Hook had been convicted and sentenced to death for a murder committed in 1985 following an encounter in a bar. The Supreme Court held that, judging by professional standards existing at the time of Van Hook's trial (rather than by more recent American Bar Association standards), the attorneys conducted an adequate investigation and provided sufficient representation. The Court said, "This is not a case in which the defendant’s attorneys failed to act while potentially powerful mitigating evidence stared them in the face, cf. Wiggins, or would have been apparent from documents any reasonable attorney would have obtained, cf. Rompilla v. Beard. It is instead a case, like Strickland itself, in which defense counsel’s 'decision not to seek more' mitigating evidence from the defendant’s background 'than was already in hand' fell 'well within the range of professionally reasonable judgments.'" (citations omitted).
CORCORAN v. LEVENHAGEN, No. 08-10495
Cert. granted and decision of the Seventh Cir. vacated, Oct. 20, 2009 (per curiam)
Joseph Corcoran of Indiana presented five issues in his federal habeas petition. The District Court granted him relief on his Sixth Amendment sentencing claims and did not resolve his other claims. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the District Court's habeas grant but did not review the other four claims. In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court held: "We now grant certiorari and hold that the Seventh Circuit erred in disposing of Corcoran’s other claims without explanation of any sort. The Seventh Circuit should have permitted the District Court to consider Corcoran’s unresolved challenges to his death sentence on remand, or should have itself explained why such consideration was unnecessary."
See the Court's Opinion.
Orders of the Court
JOHN ALLEN MUHAMMAD v. KELLY, No. 09–7328 (09A428)
ON APPLICATION FOR STAY AND ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT [November 9, 2009]
The application for stay of execution of sentence of death presented to THE CHIEF JUSTICE and by him referred to the Court is denied. The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.
Statement of JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG and JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR join, respecting the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari:
This case highlights once again the perversity of executing inmates before their appeals process has been fully concluded. Under our normal practice, Muhammad’stimely petition for certiorari would have been reviewed at our Conference on November 24, 2009. Virginia has scheduled his execution for November 10, however, so we must resolve the petition on an expedited basis unless we grant a temporary stay. By denying Muhammad’s stay application, we have allowed Virginia to truncate our deliberative process on a matter—involving a death row inmate—that demands the most careful attention. This result is particularly unfortunate in light of the limited time Muhammad was given to make his case in the District Court.
I continue to believe that the Court would be wise to adopt a practice of staying all executions scheduled in advance of the completion of our review of a capital defendant’s first application for a federal writ of habeas corpus. Such a practice would give meaningful effect to the distinction Congress has drawn between first and successive habeas petitions. See 28 U. S. C. §2244(b). It would also serve the interests of avoiding irreversible error, facilitating the efficient management of our docket, and preserving basic fairness by ensuring death row inmates receive the same procedural safeguards that ordinary inmates receive.
Having reviewed petitioner’s claims, I do not dissent from the Court’s decision to deny certiorari. “I do, however, remain firmly convinced that no State should be allowed to foreshorten this Court’s orderly review of . . . first-time habeas petition[s] by executing prisoners before that review can be completed.” (citations omitted). UPDATE: Muhammad was executed on Nov. 10, 2009.
Order issued for evidentiary hearing in District Court, Aug. 17, 2009
On August 17 the United States Supreme Court ordered a new evidentiary hearing for Georgia death row inmate Troy Davis, whose case has drawn worldwide attention because of new evidence of his possible innocence. For the first time in nearly 50 years, the Court has favorably responded to a petition directed to them, rather than as an appeal from other courts. With only two Justices writing in dissent, the Court ordered the lower federal court to hear Davis' evidence: "The District Court should receive testimony and make findings of fact as to whether evidence that could not have been obtained at the time of trial clearly establishes petitioner’s innocence."
Since Davis' initial conviction in 1991, seven of nine eyewitnesses against him have recanted their testimony. Justice Stevens, concurring with Justices Breyer and Ginsburg, wrote, "The substantial risk of putting an innocent man to death clearly provides an adequate justification for holding an evidentiary hearing." He further responded to Justice Scalia's dissent, which would have denied Davis' request on narrow legal grounds, by strongly rejecting the notion that the law allows the execution of an innocent person: "[I]magine a petitioner in Davis’s situation who possesses new evidence conclusively and definitively proving, beyond any scintilla of doubt, that he is an innocent man. The dissent’s reasoning would allow such a petitioner to be put to death nonetheless. The Court correctly refuses to endorse such reasoning." An amicus brief had been filed on behalf of Davis by former members of the judiciary and law enforcement officials, including former Georgia Congressman Bob Barr and the former director of the FBI William S. Sessions.
Justice Sotomayor took no part in the ruling. Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia's dissent. Troy Davis had submitted a petition directly with the Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus. If ultimately granted, his conviction could be overturned and he could be set free.
(Sources: J. Holland, "Supreme Court says Georgia man should get hearing," Associated Press, August 17, 2009; In re Troy Anthony Davis, No. 08-1443, U.S. (Aug. 17, 2009) (Stevens, J., concurring); Scotusblog.com).
Amicus Brief of judges and prosecutors
In re Troy Anthony Davis (Supreme Court order)
Juveniles and Life Without Parole
On May 4, 2009, the Supreme Court granted cert. in two cases involving juvenile offenders. While the two cases below are not death penalty cases, both rely heavily on the Supreme Court's decision in Roper v. Simmons (2005), regarding juveniles and the death penalty. See Juveniles.
Docket: 08-7412
Title: Graham v. Florida
Oral argument: Nov. 9, 2009 (10:00 am)
Issue: Whether the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments prohibits the imprisonment of a juvenile for life without the possibility of parole as punishment for the juvenile’s commission of non-homicide.
Docket: 08-7621
Title: Sullivan v. Florida
Oral argument: Nov. 9, 2009 (11:00 am)
Issue: Does imposition of a life without parole sentence on a thirteen-year-old for a non-homicide violate the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, where the freakishly rare imposition of such a sentence reflects a national consensus on the reduced criminal culpability of children?